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Federal Power Over Things Which
Affect Interstate Commerce
EDWIN R. TEPLE*
The commerce power of the federal government has been
one of the most prolific sources of that government's authority
to regulate. Interstate commerce, the life stream of the nation,
is subject to regulation by only one supreme authority, and the
United States Supreme Court, in permitting the commerce
power to be extended, has recognized the importance of that
power in preserving an indestructible union composed of 48
sovereign states, capable of solving the problems created by con-
flicting interests and correcting conditions arising beyond the
jurisdiction of any particular state.1
Any attempt to discover the beginning of the broad inter-
pretation of the commerce power by the Supreme Court must
date back to the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden.2 The language
of Chief Justice Marshall in that case has become classic. In
the following words we find the ultimate basis for most exten-
sions of the federal power where the commerce clause has been
invoked:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitu-
tion. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Con-
gress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects,
the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
* A.B., Ohio Northern; J.D., Ohio State; Assistant Attorney, Office of
the General Counsel, Social Security Board, Washington, D. C.
1 See note i00, infra.
2 9 Wheat. i, 6 L. Ed. 23 (18z4). A New York statute'granting exclu-
sive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of the state with steam
propelled vessels was held to be repugnant to the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution so far as it prohibited vessels duly licensed by the United States to
carry on the coasting trade from navigating those waters.
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states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single gov-
ernment, having in its Constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States.'
Another landmark in the history of the extension of the
federal government's power to regulate by authority of the
commerce clause is embodied in the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Ferger.4 Congress may punish the forging
of bills of lading used in interstate commerce on the ground
that commerce would be directly impaired and weakened by the
unrestrained right to fabricate and circulate spurious bills of
lading apparently connected with such commerce. Genuine bills
of lading for the movement of interstate commerce are conveni-
ent and highly necessary instrumentalities of that commerce,
and the injection of fraudulent imitations into the stream must
necessarily have an impeding effect. Thus it is the threat of
such obstruction which Congress has the power to remove, in
order to prevent material injury to the flow of commerce. In
speaking of the extent of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce, the court said:
Obviously that power, if it is to exist, must include the authority to
deal with obstructions to interstate commerce . . . and with a host of
other acts which, because of their relation to and influence upon inter-
state commerce, come within the power of Congress to regulate,
although they are not interstate commerce ;n and of themselves.' (Ital-
ics ours).
The year 1937 has been marked by a third milestone, in the
form of the Supreme Court's decisions upholding the National
Labor Relations Act in its application to three companies of a
type heretofore considered local and entirely beyond the fed-
eral power to regulate; one manufacturing steel;' another,
trailers;7 and a third making clothing.'
3 Id., at pp. 196-197.
4 250 U.S. 199, 39 S. Ct. 445, 63 L. Ed. 936 (ix91).
I Id., at p. 203.
' National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 8i L. Ed. 563 (1937).
7 National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49,
5 7 S. Ct. 642, 8i L. Ed. 563 (1937).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.,
301 U.S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 645, 8i L. Ed. 563 (i937).
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The Act itself makes it unlawful to interfere with the right
to organize or to collectively bargain in any case where such
"unfair labor practices" will affect interstate commerce. Its
purpose is to eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce
caused by the denial by particular employers of the right of em-
ployees to organize and from the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining. Whether or not particu-
lar action does affect interstate commerce in such a dose and
intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence
to lie within the authority conferred upon the National Labor
Relations Board, is left by the statute to be determined as indi-
vidual cases arise.
In the Jones & Laughlin case the court had the following
to say with respect to things which may affect interstate com-
merce:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control.9
With respect to the case at hand, the court further said:
In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the
effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immedi-
ate and might be catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the
plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct
and indirect effects in an intelligent vacuum. Because there may be but
indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with
a host of local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow
that other industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate
relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of industrial
strife a matter of the most urgent national concern. When industries
organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to inter-
state commerce the dominant fact6r in their activities, how can it be
maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden
field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
9 Op. ci., note 6, at p. 37. Authority cited for this statement is Schzechter
Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570
(1935).
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interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial
war? "
Two of the most significant statements in the Wagner Act
decisions are contained in the opinion in the Jones & Laughlin
case:
It is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which
is the criterion.'"
The question is necessarily one of degree.' 2
There is no doubt as to the meaning of these expressions.
This, the present position of the majority of the Supreme Court,
represents the recognition of a new principle hardly to be recon-
ciled with the language in the opinions rendered in Schechter
Corporation v. United States" and Carter v. Carter Coal Co."4
The Schechter decision reiterates the "necessary and well-
established distinction between direct and indirect effects," but
the court's discussion does not add much more to the fund of
already existing knowledge on the subject, except to hold that
the hours and wages of employees engaged in slaughtering and
selling in the local trade have no direct relation to interstate
10 Op. cit., note 6, at p. 41. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., located in
the state of Pennsylvania, is the fourth largest producer of steel in the country.
With 19 subsidiaries it owns or controls its own railroads, ore steamships,
quarries, warehouses, shops, fabricating plants and stores. Its operations are
carried on in at least a dozen states and 75 per cent of its products are shipped
outside of Pennsylvania.
In the Fruehauf case, the corporation, with its plant located in Detroit,
Michigan, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of trailers, the largest
concern of its kind in the country. Most of its raw materials and parts were
shipped in from other states, and more than 8o per cent of its sales were of
products shipped outside of the state.
The Friedman case involved a corporation having its plant in Virginia
but which obtained over 99 per cent of its raw material from other states, in
the form of woolen and worsted goods. Cotton linings were shipped in from
the southern states. More than 8z per cent of the finished garments were
purchased by customers outside of the state of Virginia, mainly large depart-
ment stores and men's clothing establishments. With respect to the men's
clothing industry as a whole, it was shown that the finished product is sold
throughout the nation, only about 48 per cent of the total sales being made
in the seven states which produce about 90 per cent of the total output.
11 Op. cit., note 6, at p. 32.
22 Op. cit., note 6, at p. 37-
3 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
14 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
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commerce, and that the other violations charged, relating to the
making of local sales, have merely an indirect effect upon inter-
state commerce.
"If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enter-
prises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect
effect upon interstate commerce," the court explained, "the fed-
eral authority would embrace practically all the activities of the
people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns
would exist only by sufferance of the federal government."'"
The Supreme Court was more explicit in the Carter case.
The following quotation explains the attitude of the majority
at that time:
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle
between employers and employees over the matter of wages, working
conditions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and the resulting
strikes, curtailment and irregularity of production and effect upon prices;
and it is insisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby.
But, in addition to what has just been said, the conclusive answer is that
the evils are all local evils over which the federal government has no
legislative control. The relation of employer and employee is a local
relation. At common law it is one of the domestic relations. The wages
are paid for the doing of local work. Working conditions are obviously
local conditions. The employees are not engaged in or about commerce,
but exclusively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and
evils, which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are local
controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish
that local result. Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however
extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the great-
ness of the effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its character."B
Justice McReynolds, delivering the dissenting opinion in
15 Op. cit., note 13, at p. 546. The existence of a limit on federal author-
ity was recognized by the majority of the court in the Jones & Laughlin case,
as the following words indicate: "Undoubtedly the scope of this power must
be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create
a completely centralized government." Op. cit., note 6, at p. 37. See Powell,
Commerce, Pensions, and Codes, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 210.
160 p. cit., note 14, at p. 308.
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the Labor Board cases, quoted freely the language of the Carter
opinion and concluded with the protest that, "Any effect on
interstate commerce by the discharge of employees shown here,
would be indirect and remote in the highest degree, as consider-
ation of the facts will show."' 7
It is interesting to note that the opinion in the Carter case is
dependent largely upon the authority of the Schechter decision.
First, it involved exactly the same situation as confronted the
court in the Schechter case, except that in the latter case the
power was asserted over goods which had come to rest, while
in the former it was exerted over goods at rest before interstate
commerce began. In the court's own words, this difference "is
without significance." Second, the Schechter case is the only
authority cited in support of the court's deductions concerning
direct and indirect effect upon interstate commerce. Third, the
court repeated the fear expressed in the Schechter case, that if
the federal government were allowed to regulate these matters,
there would be no end to the local things which might be con-
trolled by the federal authority.
The decisions in Schechter Corporation v. United States
and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. were not overruled by the ma-
jority in the Jones & Laughlin case. The former was distin-
guished on the ground that to have found immediacy or direct-
ness there would have been to find it almost everywhere, a
result inconsistent with the maintenance of our federal system.
The latter was distinguished because in that case there was
improper delegation of legislative power, and the requirements
not only went beyond any sustainable measure of protection of
interstate commerce but were also inconsistent with due process.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that both the language and the
holding in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp. have repudiated the test based upon a determina-
tion of whether the effect upon interstate commerce is direct or
indirect, set forth in the Carter opinion. An artificial test based
17 Op. cit., note 6, at p. 96.
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upon the proximity of the activity or condition and the character
of the effect, has given way to a test which realistically considers
primarily the extent of the effect, disregarding the source of the
injury which has been inflicted, or is threatened, upon interstate
commerce. The recognition of this new criterion may well be
the basis for a continuation of the steady growth of the federal
power, according to the needs of the nation.
According to the Supreme Court in Schechter Corporation v.
United States, "The power of Congress extends, not only to the
regulation of transactions which are part of interstate commerce,
but to the protection of that commerce from injury." Anything
which is important enough to threaten substantial injury to that
commerce should logically fall within the pale. In the final
analysis, if the object is the prevention of injury, of what mo-
ment is the source of the activity which threatens it! Is it not
conceivable that great and irreparable injury may result from a
source which may technically be referred to as indirect?
The Supreme Court's decision in the Jones & Laughlin
case is not the first indication that the question is primarily one
of degree. In 1935, Judge Learned Hand, in the course of his
opinion in United States v. Schechter Poultry Corporation,"
made the following observation:
In an industrial society bound together by means of transport and
communication as rapid and certain as ours, it is idle to seek for any
transaction, however apparently isolated, which may not have an effect
elsewhere; such a society is an elastic medium which transmits all tre-
mors throughout its territory; the only question is of their size.' 9
"The true question," according to Howard E. Wahren-
brock, "seems to be one of the degree of effect upon interstate
commerce. This involves a question of fact."2
18 76 Fed. (2d) 617, 624, 295 U.S. 723, 79 L. Ed. 1676.
19 After reviewing a group of the Supreme Court's decisions bearing upon
the point, Judge Hand concluded, "The truth really is that where the border
shall be fixed is a question of degree, dependent upon the consequences in
each case." Op. cit., note 18, at p. 625.2 0 Federal Anti-Trust Law and the National Industrial Recovery Act, 31
Mich. L. Rev. 1009, 1054 (933).
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An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court in
this field, in the light of their facts, seems to lend further sup-
port to this position and aids in defining the scope of the federal
power to regulate things not themselves a part of interstate
commerce.
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, seeking to regu-
late the business of packers and commission men done in inter-
state commerce was upheld in Stafford v. Wallace." It was
conceded that the sales and purchases by commission men and
dealers were in and of themselves intrastate commerce and
would ordinarily be treated as such, the parties to the sales and
purchases, as well as the cattle, all being at the time within the
city of Chicago. But because the stockyards were merely a
"throat" through which the current of commerce flowed, the
stockyards themselves and the sales therein being necessary
factors in the middle of this current, such activities were found
to threaten interstate commerce with a "direct and undue bur-
den." Thus the regulatory power of Congress was extended
to whatever threatens "to obstruct or unduly to burden the
freedom of interstate commerce."
In Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States," an order of
the Secretary of Agriculture prescribing a tariff of maximum
charges to be made by brokers, issued pursuant to the Packers
and Stockyards Act, was sustained. Here it was emphasized
that the plaintiffs performed indispensable service in the inter-
state commerce in livestock and enjoyed a substantial monopoly
at the Omaha stockyards. "The purpose of the regulation at-
tacked," said the court, "is to prevent their service from thus
becoming an undue burden upon, and obstruction of, that com-
merce."
Another case involving the Chicago "throat," Chicago Board
of Trade v. Olson,21 upheld the Grain Futures Act which regu-
lated boards of trade and was designed to prevent market ma-
21 258 U.S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735 (1922).
22 z8o U.S. 420, 50 S. Ct. 220, 74 L. Ed. 524. (930).
23 62 U.S. i, 43 S. Ct. 47o, 67 L. Ed. 839 (0923).
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nipulations in grain futures. Here again the objects of the
regulation were in no sense engaged in interstate commerce, but
the court explained that, "the act only purports to regulate in-
terstate commerce and sales of grain for future delivery on
boards of trade because it finds that by manipulation they have
become a constantly recurring burden and obstruction to that
commerce.2)
The unique location of the Chicago Board of Trade at the
scene of the greatest concentration of wheat in the world gave
its manipulations a countrywide effect on the price of the article,
which in tutrn directly affected the country-wide commerce in
it. The same was true of the Chicago stockyards and, to a lesser
extent, of the Omaha yards. The immediate and direct effect
of the activities regulated had to do with the price of the
commodities concerned, the price in turn exerting an influence
on the interstate movement of such commodities. Precisely
speaking, the effect in these cases was indirect, but it was real
nevertheless, and by reason of the unique location of the activi-
ties mentioned, at the throat of a nation-wide movement, sub-
stantial injury to interstate commerce was threatened. This, it
is submitted, is the underlying reason for the court's decisions
upholding the acts in question, the reason for the court's finding
that the effect was "direct."2"
The railroads have been a frequent source of controversies
regarding the regulatory power of Congress. Railroads must
perhaps be relegated to a distinct class of their own because of
the important part they play in the actual movement of inter-
24 "The question of price," explained the Supreme Court in Chicago
Board of Trade v. Olson, "dominates trade between the states. Sales of an
article which affect the country-wide price of the article directly affect the
country-wide commerce in it. By reason and authority, therefore, in determin-
ing the validity of this act, we are prevented from questioning the conclusion
of Congress that manipulation of the market for futures on the Chicago Board
of Trade may, and from time to time does, directly burden and obstruct com-
merce between the states in grain, and that it recurs and is a constantly possible
danger. For this reason, Congress has the power to provide the appropriate
means adopted in this act by which this abuse may be restrained and avoided."
Op. cit., note 23, at p. 40.
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state commerce. All the activities in which the railroads engage,
however, are not a part of interstate commerce, and those activi-
ties which are purely local, or relate solely to intrastate com-
merce, are beyond Congress' power to regulate. 5 Only those
things which have or threaten to have a substantial effect upon
the interstate business of the carrier are considered within that
power.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Virginian R.
Co. v. System Fed. No. 4o, upholding the Railway Labor Act
which contained provisions designed in general to provide for
the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning
rates of pay, rules or working conditions, indicates dearly the
test applied in these cases. The application of the Act to the
"back shop" employees of the carrier who took no part in the
actual interstate activities, was specifically upheld. "The power
of Congress over interstate commerce," it was said, "extends to
such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their em-
ployees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption
of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendent dis-
orders.""
The following words of the court are noteworthy for the
emphasis they give to size or extent of the effect which is
threatened:
The relation of the back shop to transportation is such that a strike
of petitioner's employees there, quite apart from the likelihood of its
spreading to the department, would subject petitioner to the danger,
substantial, though possibly indefinable in its extent, of interruption of
25 Employers Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, z8 S. Ct. 14r, 52 L. Ed.
297 (x9o8), where a statute seeking to regulate the liability of interstate
carriers for injuries to any employee even though his employment had no
connection whatever with interstate commerce, was held beyond the power of
Congress; Florida v. United States, 28z U.S. 194, 51 S. Ct. 119, 75 L. Ed.
291 (930).
"5 300 U.S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 470 (937).
27 Op. cit., note 26, at p. 553. See, also, Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Rail-
way Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570, 50 S. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034 (1930), hold-
ing that Congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which
threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation.
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the transportation service. The cause is not too remote from the effect.
The relation between them is not tenuous. The effect on commerce
cannot be regarded as negligible.2"
The fixing of intrastate rates by the Interstate Commerce
Commission affords an excellent illustration of the power of
the federal government over things which might technically be
held to have only an indirect effect upon interstate commerce.
Low intrastate rates may reduce the income of the carrier,
which in turn may burden the carrier's general revenues, with
the final result that there may be an interference with the main-
tenance of an adequate interstate transportation system.29 How-
ever remote, the danger is real and the possible effect upon
interstate commerce is substantial. It has been definitely decided
that Congress has power to control intrastate charges of an inter-
state carrier to the extent necessary to prevent injurious or un-
reasonable discrimination against interstate commerce."
Congress has the power to protect the safety of persons and
property employed or being transported in interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has upheld the Safety Appliance Act in its
28 Op. cit., note 26, at p. 556. The Supreme Court said: "The Employ-
ers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 498, which mentioned railroad repair
shops as a subject beyond the power to regulate commerce, are not controlling
here. Whatever else may be said of that pronouncement, it is obvious that the
commerce power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as its sub-
ject matter. It is enough for present purposes that experience has shown that
the failure to settle, by peaceful means, the grievances of railroad employees
with respect to rates of pay, rules or working conditions, is far more likely to
hinder interstate commerce than the failure to compensate workers who have
suffered injury in the course of their employment. Op. cit., note 26, at p. 557.
29 In Florida v. United States, supra., note z4, the court indicated this
much when it held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was not justi-
fied in fixing statewide rates without a finding, suported by evidence, as to the
essential facts and the effect of intrastate rates upon the income of the carrier,
which would justify the conclusion that the order was needed to avoid an
undue burden on the carrier's revenues and a consequent interference with an
adequate transportation system. Mere existence of the disparity was not enough.
"oHouston & Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct.
833, 58 L. Ed. 1341 (1914); Railway Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago
B & Q R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. io86
(1922); Penna. R. Co. v. Illinois Brick Co., 297 U.s. 447, 56 S. Ct. 556,
8o L. Ed. 796 (1936); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 42 S. Ct.
239, 66 L. Ed. 385 (1922).
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application to all of the locomotives, cars and similar vehicles
used on any railroad that is a highway of interstate commerce,
whether such cars or vehicles are being used to move interstate
or intrastate traffic." In upholding the Employers' Liability
Act after it was changed to apply solely to the liability of a
carrier engaged in interstate commerce for injuries sustained by
its employees while engaged in such commerce, the court indi-
cated that the federal control over the employer's liability was
not altered by the fact that the injury might be caused by an
employee engaged in intrastate commerce. The court made it
dear that the effect of the injury upon interstate commerce,
rather than its source, is the "criterion of congressional power,"
and the negligence of an employee engaged in intrastate com-
merce, "when operating injuriously upon an employee engaged
in interstate commerce, has the same effect upon that com-
merce as if the negligent employee were also engaged therein." 2
The intrastate activities of interstate railroads, other than
those relating to rates and the safety of passengers and employ-
ees, have been brought within the scope of federal regulation in
numerous instances. The Interstate Commerce Commission
may require a railroad to furnish transportation service between
a public terminal and shippers on its own and connecting lines,
although the transportation so required includes intrastate as
well as interstate traffic.3 The commission may require the
adoption of a uniform system of accounting by carriers engaged
in interstate transportation under a common arrangement for
continuous carriage, even though such system embraces the
accounts of purely local activities of the carrier, such as the
operation of an amusement park. The Hours of Service Act
31 S outhtrn R. Co. v. United States, zzz U.S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed.
72 (I91Ii).
32 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. I, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L.
Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (NS) 44 (1912) ; See, also, Pederson v. D. L. & W. R.
Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648.
"' United States v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 272 U.S. 457, 47 S. Ct. 130, 71
L. Ed. 350 (1926).
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applies to employees of an interstate line although engaged
partly in intrastate work.35
A similar situation exists in the cases where the Interstate
Commerce Commission has been granted the oversight of proj-
ects entirely local in nature when it appeared that the financial
stability and efficiency of the interstate lines might thereby be
impaired. Before an extension of the main lines and terminals
of several interstate railroads could be made within a city, ac-
companied by the abandonment of available sites and existing
stations and the building of a new union station, a finding of the
Interstate Commerce Commission was required that the expense
would not impair the ability of the carriers to perform their
duty to the public, i.e., their interstate function." Likewise, it
was held that a railroad could not build an extension into new
territory within a single state unless the Commission issued a
certificate that public convenience and necessity required its con-
struction.". The exercise of federal power in authorizing the
abandonment of a branch line of a railroad lying wholly within
the state of the owning company's incorporation, was held not
to be an invasion of the field reserved by the Constitution to the
states, for the paramount power of Congress over interstate
commerce enabled it to determine to what extent and in what
manner intrastate service had to be subordinated in order that
interstate service might be adequately rendered. 8
The latter instances of federal control of the intrastate
activities of railroads are much like the jurisdiction of Congress
over intrastate rates. Close analysis will reveal that several
steps must be taken before any effect upon interstate commerce
"
4 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., zz4 U.S.
194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (I9IZ).
35 B. & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce CommissiW, 2Zz U.S. 612,
31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878 (19ii).
" Railway Commission v. So. Pacific R. Co., 264 U.S. 331, 44 S. Ct.
376, 68 L. Ed. 713 (19Z4).
17 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Gulf, Etc. R. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46 S. Ct.
263, 70 L. Ed. 578 (1926).
38 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452, 70 L. Ed.
878 (1926).
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itself can be detected. But here again the effect is real and it is
likely to be substantial. This may be said to result mainly from
the commingling of interstate and intrastate traffic and the diffi-
culty of separating the two for the purpose of operation or
effective regulation."a
Further illustration of the things which may be said to af-
fect interstate commerce directly is found in the decisions of the
Supreme Court applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.4" Cases
in this field have abundantly shown that even activities related
to productive industry, which, when viewed separately, is local,
may have the requisite directness to come within reach of the
federal regulatory power.4
The Anti-Trust Act condemns all combinations or conspir-
acies in restraint of trade among the several states or with for-
eign countries. Although the cases arising under this statute
involve its application rather than its constitutional validity, the
distinction between a direct and an indirect effect upon inter-
state commerce is almost invariably applied. "The contract
condemned by the statute is one whose direct and immediate
effect is a restraint upon that kind of trade or commerce which
is interstate."41 2 On the other hand, where the intent to restrain
interstate commerce or to monopolize any part of it is absent,
and the objectives are limited to intrastate activities, the fact
that there may be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce
" The language of the Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States,
263 U.S. 456, 44 S. Ct. x69, 68 L. Ed. 388 (i924) is revealing: "In solving
the problem of maintaining the efficiency of an interstate commerce railway
system which serves both the states and the nation, Congress is dealing with a
unit in which state and interstate operations are often inextricably commingled.
When the adequate maintenance of interstate commerce involves and makes
necessary on this account the incidental and partial control of intrastate com-
merce, the power of Congress to exercise such control has been dearly estab-
lished." Ib., at p. 485.
40 z6 Stat. 2o9, 15 U.S.C.A., sec. i.
41 See the words of the Supreme Court to this effect in the Jones &
Laughlin case, supra, note 6, at p. 38.4 2 Hopkihzs v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592, 19 S. Ct. 40, 43 L. Ed.
z9o (1898).
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does not subject the parties concerned to the Anti-Trust Act,
notwithstanding its broad provisions. 3
The primary purpose of the Anti-Trust Act is to foster
competition. Its basic principle, as explained by the Supreme
Court, is that the natural effect of competition is to increase
commerce, and that an agreement, the intent or direct effect
of which is to prevent free competition, tends to restrain rather
than promote trade and commerce. 4 Any conspiracy or com-
bination which-has for its immediate object the stifling of com-
petition in interstate commerce is brought directly within the
prohibition of the statute.45 In such a case, interstate commerce
is the direct object of the attack and there is no question con-
cerning the federal government's authority to act. But the
specific intent to obstruct interstate commerce is not always
essential. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Read-
ing Co.," "Of course, if the necessary result is materially to
restrain trade between the states, the intent with which the thing
was done is of no consequence." 7 "In other words, when the
threatened effect of the combination or activity upon interstate
commerce is sufficiently great, the federal government may act."
Here again is definite support for the court's statement in the
Jones & Laughlin case that the question is necessarily one of
degree.4
An examination of the opinions of the Supreme Court in
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.49 and Coronado
" United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S. Ct.
57o , 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762 (1927). Industrial Associatioz v. United
States, 268 U.S. 64, 45 S. Ct. 403, 69 L. Ed. 849 (1925).
4' Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 N.S. 197, 331, 24 S. Ct.
436, 48 L. Ed. 679 (1904).
" Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 S. Ct.
551, 69 L. Ed. 963 (19? 5).
46 226 U.S. 324, 33 S. Ct. 90, 57 L. Ed. 243 (1912).
47 Id. at p. 37o. To the same effect is United States v. Patten, zz6 U.S.
525, 543, 33 S- Ct. 14, 57 L. Ed. 333 (1913)-.
4 Further in this connection, note the words of the court in United
States v. Reading Co., note 59, infra.
4' Supra, note 43.
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Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers" discloses quite dearly that
the court is not oblivious to considerations of size. In the first
case it was held that the activities of the defendants did not
amount to a violation of the Anti-Trust Act. The court was of
the opinion that the animosity growing out of bringing in non-
union labor and other aggravating circumstances presented suffi-
cient local reason for the violence and the destruction of the
mines, so that there could be no necessary inference of an intent
to interfere with interstate commerce. The court also felt that
the normal output of the mines concerned (5ooo tons a week
as compared to 150,000 tons for the entire district) was not
enough to have a substantial effect on prices and competition
in interstate commerce, which would dispense with the necessity
of finding a specific intent."
The second case involved the same controversy, but new
evidence was presented for the court's consideration. First, tes-
timony was introduced to show that the strike leaders and union
men participating in the destruction of the mines had discussed
the competitive effects of cheaper coal from non-union mines
after it was shipped to other states, both in a union convention
and in speeches made throughout the district in which the strike
occurred. Second, more accurate testimony disclosed that the
capacity of the mines which were destroyed, more nearly ap-
proximated 5000 tons a day, or about 35,000 tons a week. On
the basis of these facts, the court held that the case came within.
the terms of the Anti-Trust Act, both the intent and the actual
effect being to interfere with interstate commerce. That both
factors were considered in reaching their decision is indicated
by the court's statement that the "total capacity . . . became
more important, in view of the direct testimony as to the mov-
"I Supra, note 45.
51 The court did indicate, however, that "if Congress deems certain re-
curring practices, though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to ob-
truct, restrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national
supervision and restraint." Op. cit., note 43, at p. 408.
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ing purpose of District No. 21 to restrain and prevent the plain-
tiff's competition.""
In most of the cases involving combinations which were
challenged under the Sherman Act, the dominating factor in
the Supreme Court's decisions was the effectiveness of the ac-
tivities sought to be curtailed. If a combination is so extensive
that an entire industry is brought within its control, competition
is necessarily destroyed and questions of price, interstate move-
ment of the products, etc., are decided entirely at the discretion
of the group in control. In United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,
the first decision involving the application of the Anti-Trust
Act, such facts were said to be immaterial, the court being of the
opinion that the federal government had no authority to inter-
vene if the combination related solely to the manufacture of an
article. The American Sugar Refining Company, through the
purchase of stock in four Philadelphia refineries, gained a prac-
tical monopoly of the entire business, but it was held that the
Anti-Trust Act did not apply since no intent was shown to
monopolize interstate commerce and any effect upon that com-
merce was necessarily indirect. Since the date of the Knight
case, however, it is apparent that the court has taken a different
position, adopting the view expressed by Justice Harlan in his
dissent, that "the free course of trade among the states cannot
coexist with such 'combinations.""
The effectiveness of a particular combination may result
from the strategic location of the activities challenged. A com-
bination of meat dealers which was centered in the Chicago area,
within the state of Illinois and embracing a monopoly of the
trade solely within that area, was held to be illegal and subject
to restraint under the Anti-Trust Act." Chicago was the heart
of the meat packing industry, and by reason of its strategic
52 Op. cit., note 45, at p. 309.
53 156 U.S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (895).
- Id., at p. 37.
5 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed.
518 (1905).
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position the combination in question obtained a strangle hold
on the national "flow" of fresh meat and meat products. By
virtue of this power, the combination sought to regulate prices
in other states, to induce shipments to markets therein, and to
get less than the lawful rates from interstate railroads, and
these facts were held sufficient to show an intent to monopolize
interstate commerce itself.
Size alone may be just as effective. Dealings in cotton fu-
tures, where they were part of a conspiracy to bring the entire
cotton trade within its influence, were held to be in restraint of
interstate commerce and in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. "
The corner would have enabled the conspirators to obtain con-
trol of the entire available supply of cotton and to enhance the
price to all buyers in every market in the country. Confronted
by these facts, the court ruled that, "by purposely engaging in
a conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result
which the statute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal con-
templation, chargeable with intending that result."
Other cases further substantiate the position that no addi-
tional objection is created by the fact that the activities con-
cerned are themselves entirely intrastate in nature. A series of
identical contracts, between interstate carriers and a great ma-
jority of the independent coal operators in the Penns3,vania
hard coal region, to market all the coal of the latter for all time
at an agreed percentage of the tide-water price, was held to be
part of a concerted scheme to control the sale of the independ-
ent output and therefore constituted an unreasonable combina-
tion in restraint of trade within the prohibition of the Sherman
Act." The contracts at the time of the suit covered nearly half
the tonnage of independent operators and it was highly probable
that the entire independent output would be absorbed. After
indicating that the mere fact that the sales and deliveries took
place in Pennsylvania was not controlling," the court said,
"I United States v. Patten, supra, note 47.
57 United States v. Reading Co., supra, note 46.
r" Op. cit., note 46, at pp. 367 and 368.
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"Whether a particular act, contract, or agreement was a reason-
able and normal method in furtherance of trade and commerce
may, in doubtful cases, turn upon the intent to be inferred from
the extent of the control thereby secured over the commerce
affected, as well as the method which was used.""9
The same result was reached where there was a combination
of six large corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale
of cast iron pipe, with plants strategically located in ihe middle
west and south the output of which was considerably more than
half of the entire production of the territory affected, the
scheme covering the sale of their product in thirty-six states;"0
where there was an agreement between concerns controlling
over 80 per cent of the business of manufacturing and distribut-
ing pottery throughout the country, to fix and maintain uniform
prices; 6 where it was sought by combination to gain control of
the entire petroleum industry,62 as well as the entire tobacco
business. 3
A particular combination may be effective within a more
limited area, but this fact does not affect the power of the
federal government to act. If the effect is to materially impede
interstate commerce between two states it is enough to constitute
a violation of the Anti-Trust Act. Thus violations of the Act
were found where manufacturers, contractors, and carpenters in
Chicago combined to destroy the competition of non-union mills
situated in Wisconsin by refusing to install non-union made
millwork, there being evidence to show that outside competition
was materially lessened, proving that the combination was large
and powerful enough to accomplish the control of competition
" Op. cit., note 46, at p. 370.60 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 20 S. Ct.
9 6, 44 L. Ed. 136 (1899).
6" United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377,
71 L. Ed. 700 (19z7).
62 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 2zi U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 5 L.
Ed. 619 (i9I).
63 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 22I U.S. io6, 31 S. Ct. 632,
55 L. Ed. 663 (1911).
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in interstate commerce; ' where dealers in tile in San Francisco
combined to prevent non-members from buying from manu-
facturers outside of the state, the latter having agreed with the
association to sell only to members;"6 where retail lumber deal-
ers combined and agreed to blacklist or boycott any wholesaler
who engaged in retail trade56a where a combination threatened
the free movement of live poultry into the metropolitan area of
New York, by means of interference with unloading, transpor-
tation within local area, sales by marketmen to retailers, the
prices charged and the amount of profits exacted."
The articles involved in the latter cases were being trans-
ported in interstate commerce, and the effect of the local com-
binations was to destroy competition in such articles in the
particular areas of activity. In this limited sense, the combina-
tions were highly effective and destroyed, or threatened to
destroy, competition in interstate commerce. On the other
hand, where the combination is directed only against competi-
tion in local matters or contemplates control of a purely local
situation, and is reasonably conducted, so that any effect upon
interstate commerce is so indefinite or slight as to render it in-
discernible for all practical purposes, the Anti-Trust Act has
been held inapplicable."
"' United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169, 71 L. Ed. 403
(1926).
c Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 24 S. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed.
6o8 (904).
" Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234
U.S. 600, 34 S. Ct. 951, 58 L. Ed. 1490 (1914).
67 Local z67 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc. v. United
States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396, 78 L. Ed. 804 (i934).
" Industrial Association v. United States, supra, note 43 (all the materials
affected were produced in California except one, and that one was not dealt
with until it had become commingled with local property); Hopkins v. United
States, supra, note 42 (where there was a combination of brokers in the Kansas
City Live Stock Exchange, who merely furnished certain facilities for sales
and were not themselves the buyers and sellers); Anderson v. United States,
171 U.S. 604, 19 S. Ct. 50, 43 L. Ed. 300 (1898) (where there was a com-
bination of btokers who were the purchasers of cattle on the market, but their
agreement was merely not to employ brokers, or to recognize yard traders,
who were not members of the association).
The last two cases illustrate the line of demarcation. Charges made by
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Combinations involving railroads have been a frequent
source of litigation under the Anti-Trust Act. These cases seem
dearly to recognize the importance of size when the effect upon
interstate commerce is being considered. Thus the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 9 found a vio-
lation of the Act where the Union Pacific attempted to pur-
chase 46 per cent of the stock of the Southern Pacific, a com-
peting line, which would have been sufficient to gain control of
the latter. The crux of the opinion is contained in the following
words:
It is the scope of such combinations and their power to suppress or
stifle competition or create monopoly which determines the applicability
of the Act."
A holding company organized to control the stock of two
competing railroads, the Great Northern and the Union Pa-
cific," a combination of all of the railroads west of the Missouri
River, covering shipments of every description from that terri-
tory to the East,7 a combination of 31 railroads running be-
tween Chicago and the Atlantic coast, formed to fix rates and
the brokers in the Hopkins case, and the regulations in the Anderson case,
were found to be entirely fair and reasonable. The combination was not cal-
culated to, nor was it capable of, controlling or affecting competition in inter-
state commerce. By reason of its nature and limited scope, its effect upon the
"flow" of livestock through the yards and in interstate commerece was imper-
ceptible. These facts are in striking contrast with those of the Swift case,
supra (note 55), where, by reason of its nature and scope, the combination
threatened to embrace the entire meat packing industry.
In the Hopkins case, the Supreme Court made the following suggestion:
"It is possible that exorbitant charges for the use of these facilities might have
similar effect as a burden upon commerce that a charge upon commerce itself
might have. In a case like that the remedy would probably be forthcoming."
Op. cit., note 42, at p. 595. There would, in that case, have been a substantial
effect upon interstate commerce, which was not apparent under the facts as
actually presented.
See, also, Blumenstock Bro. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
252 U.S. 436 ,Ao S. Ct. 385, 64 L. Ed. 649 (19ZO).
69 226 U.S. 6i, 33 S. Ct. 53, 57 L. Ed. 124 (1912).
70 Id., at p. 88.
7 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, supra, note 44.
72 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290,
17 S. Ct. 540, 4 L. Ed. 1007 (897).
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fares, 3 and a plan for the unification of practically every ter-
minal facility in St. Louis i 4 were all held to be sufficiently large
and powerful to completely suppress competition, thus falling
directly within the condemnation of the Sherman Act.
In comparatively recent times, combinations or associations
of dealers or manufacturers have been formed for the purpose
of disseminating trade information designed to promote the
intelligent cooperation and best interests of the industry or busi-
ness concerned. So long as no concert of action on the part of
the members appears, or obligation to act in any prescribed way
upon the information thus obtained, and the activities can be
reasonably expected to promote interstate commerce rather than
hinder it, such associations have been upheld."' But where the
associations subject the members to certain rules and regulations
limiting the output or sales of their product, or where the char-
acter of the information gathered and the use made thereof
leads irrestistibly to the conclusion that it necessarily would
result in a concerted effort to curtail production or raise the
"' United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25,
43 L. Ed. 259 (1898).
71 United States v. St. Louis Terminal Association, 224 U.S. 383, 32
S. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 8io (I91z). St. Louis was a focal point for many east
to west railroad systems, and by reason of the physical and topographical con-
ditions of the locality the combination in question gained control of the entire
movement of interstate commerce. Thus it was said by the court: "Whether
it is a facility in aid of interstate commerce or an unreasonable restraint for-
bidden by the act of Congress ... will depend upon the intent to be inferred
from the extent of the control thereby secured over instrumentalities which
such commerce is under compulsion to use, the method by which such control
has been brought about and the manner in which that control has been
exerted." lb., at pp. 394 and 395.
" Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 45 S. Ct.
578, 69 L. Ed. 1093 (i9z5); Cement Mfg. Association v. United States,
268 U.S. 5 88, 4 5 S. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104 (I925); Appalachian Coals v.
United States, 288 U.S. 3t4, 53 S. Ct. 471, 77 L. Ed. 8z 5 (1933). See,
also, Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629, 8o
L. Ed. 859 (936).
In the laple Flooring Association case the court made the following com-
ment: "Restraint upon free competition begins when improper use is made of
that information through any concerted action which operates to restrain the
freedom of action of those who buy and sell." 268 U.S. at p. 583.
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price of the commodities in interstate commerce, they have been
held illegal under the Anti-Trust Act."8
In a prosecution under the Sherman Act, a trader who
simply refuses to sell to others is not guilty of violating its
terms, and he may withhold his goods from those who will not
sell them at the price which he fixes for their resale. He may
not, however, consistently with the Act, go beyond the exercise
of this right, and by contracts or combinations, express or im-
plied, attempt to fix the price of his products.7 The effect upon
competition, where binding agreements are included in the
trader's activities, cannot be doubted, and in such cases there is
more likelihood of a material burden upon interstate commerce.
The Anti-Trust Act has been invoked to restrain the efforts
"
8 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 4z
S. Ct. I I4, 66 L. Ed. z84 (i9zi) (where the association's plan covered one-
third of the hardwood output of the country, its secretary actively urged cur-
tailment of production and increase in prices, and frequent meetings were
held, tending to show an attempt to secure concerted action) ; United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., z6z U.S. 371, 43 S. Ct. 607, 67 L. Ed. 1035
(19z3) (where there was an elaborate system of reports covering variations
in prices, prospective buyers and other confidential details, the members were
bound to give such information when requested, and regular meetings were
held); Straus v. American Publishers' Association, 231 U.S. 222, 34. S. Ct.
84, 58 L. Ed. 192 (1913) (where the association, composed of about 75%
of the publishers in the country, made agreements with the Booksellers' Asso-
ciation, including a majority of the booksellers of the country, which obli-
gated the members to sell copyrighted books only to those who would maintain
retail prices-the court found that competition was almost totally destroyed) ;
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. ZO, 33 S. Ct. 9, 57
L. Ed. 107 (1912).
Size and concert of action characterize each one of these cases, thus
enabling the control of competition and the resulting material burden upon
interstate commerce.
77 United States v. Colgate & Co., Z50 U.S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465, 63
L. Ed. 99 z (I919); Frey & Sons, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., z56 U.S. zo8,
41 8. Ct. 451, 65 L. Ed. 89z (i9zi). In the latter case, the fact that the
manufacturer suggested a sales plan which fixed minimum prices and most
of the retailers cooperated with the plan, was held not to change the rule.
7'8 United States v. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 40 S. Ct. z51, 64
L. Ed. 471 (1920) (where there were agreements to observe certain retail
prices) ; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., z20 U.S. 373, 31 S. Ct.
376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (91I) (where a system of contracts between manufac-
turer, wholesaler, and retailer fixed the amount which the consumer had
to pay).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 79
of employees to compel the employment of union members
exclusively, in cases where the destruction of the employer's
interstate trade is the means used to accomplish the desired end.
So long as the workers' strike is confined to local operations
and there is little likelihood of material interference with inter-
state trade in the article or articles concerned, the Act has no
application. 7' But where methods are employed by the union
members to discourage the interstate sales of the employer's
product, such as the instigation of a secondary boycott,8" or the
designation of the products as "unfair,"" the Anti-Trust Act
has been applied and the activities enjoined.
An Act designed to supplement the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and to "protect competitive business from further inroads
by monopoly,""' the Federal Trade Commission Act,83 involves
7' Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549,
77 L. Ed. o62 (1933) (involving a conspiracy to halt or suppress local
building operations); United Leather Workers International Union v. Her-
kert, z65 U.S. 457, 44 S. Ct. 623, 68 L. Ed. 1104, 33 A.L.R. 566 (1924)
(involving a strike intended to prevent the continued manufacture of goods
by the employer which were intended for interstate shipment. In neither
case were facts presented to show that a material effect upon interstate com-
merce would result).
"°Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 5z L. Ed. 488
(19o8); Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 17z, 65 L. Ed.
349 (19z1). In these two cases, the first involving a hat manufacturer and
the second, a manufacturer of printing presses, the products were almost
exclusively articles of interstate trade. By means of the boycott, the union
members were attempting to destroy the employer's interstate sales, interstate
commerce being the direct object of the attack, and a material effect was
threatened.
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U.S. 37,
J47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916, 54 L. Ed. 791 (19z7) (where there was a
combination of union stone-cutters to restrain the interstate trade of certain
building stone producers by declaring their stone "unfair" and forbidding
members of the union to work on it in building construction in other states,
for which it was extensively bought and used, and thereby coercing or inducing
local employers to refrain from purchasing it); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S.
522, 35 S. Ct. 170, 59 L. Ed. 341 (i915) (where a list of "unfair" dealers,
manifestly intended to put a ban upon those whose names appeared therein,
was circulated among an important body of possible customers who were com-
bined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of such reports).
e A full explanation of the purpose of the Act is given by Justice Brandeis
in his dissent in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, Z53 U.S. 421, 435, 40
S. Ct. 57 z , 64 L. Ed. 993 (1920)-
83 38 Stat. 717, 719, 15 U.S.C.A., sec. 45-
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the same considerations. In particular, it was designed to aid
in combating any further tendencies toward concentration and
monopoly based upon unfair trade practices. It applies, of
course, only to unfair methods of competition in interstate
commerce.
Practices not characterized by deception or fraud, but con-
sidered reasonable under the particular circumstances presented,
and showing no tendency to unduly hinder competition, are
held not to amount to unfair methods of competition and are
therefore beyond reproach.8" Likewise, where claims are made
concerning a product which is not the subject of distinct compe-
tition, and such claims are not of a nature to substantially injure
persons who might be classed as competitors, there is said to be
no unfair method of competition within the meaning of the
Act. 8
5
But where the product concerned is the subject of active
competition, any claims or activities which are calculated to gain
an unfair advantage over competitors and are of a nature cal-
culated to seriously threaten continued competition in that com-
modity, may be outlawed by order of the Federal Trade
Commission."
84 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, supra, note 8z. Merchants acting
independently refused to sell cotton ties unless purchasers bought from them
a corresponding amount of jute bagging. Since the merchants were operating
alone and in good faith, and in view of the fact that ties and bagging for
cotton were closely associated articles, the court decided that no unfair methods
of competition were shown.
85 Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S. Ct.
587, 75 L. Ed. 1324 (931). The Commission ordered a party to ceasso
representing his "obesity cure" as a scientific method and a remedy for
obesity unless the claims were accompanied by x statement that the cure could
not be taken safely except under medical direction. The order was held
beyond the commission's jurisdiction, since such claims were not of a nature
to substantially injure competitors.
Il Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 54 S. Ct.
423, 78 L. Ed. 814 0933), noted in 8z U. of Pa. L. Rev. 664 (1934)
(distribution of candy packages that encouraged buying through a gambling
device); Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., z88 U.S. ziz,
53 S. Ct. 335, 77 L. Ed. 706 (i933) (sale of flour under false representation
that the flour was manufactured by the sellers); Federal Trade Commission v.
Winsted Co., 258 U.S. 483, 4 z S. Ct. 384, 66 L. Ed. 729 (19ZZ) (a manu-
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The cases under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act demonstrate that the activities en-
joined are those which are extensive enough, or sufficiently
effective by reason of their character or location, to exercise
a distinct and profound effect upon competition in articles which
are the subjects of interstate commerce. It is true that many of
these cases have been decided on the ostensibly independent
doctrine of the "rule of reason." Yet at the very least it can be
reasoned that, just as judicial acceptance of the rule of reason
eased away the perplexing question of the validity of the Sher-
man Act under the Fifth Amendment, 7 so the same doctrine
bears a relation to the problem of the scope of the anti-trust
acts as concerns the area of federal authority. To go further,
the stricter attitude of the court toward railroad than toward
industrial combinations may be rationalized as logically in terms
of the greater quantitative effect of railroad combinations upon
interstate commerce, arising as a result of the peculiar relation
of the carrier to commerce, as in those of conflicting conceptions
of monopoly and restraint of trade inherited from the common
law.
Approaching the problem from another direction, the com-
merce clause of the Constitution has been interpreted as a
limitation upon state action. The power over interstate com-
merce resides exclusively in the federal government, and the
individual states can do nothing which will materially interfere
with, or in any way tend to control, the free movement of
commodities in interstate commerce. If a state's action threat-
facturer labeled goods "natural wool" when in fact they were in large part
cotton); Algoma Lumber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, zgi U.S. 67,
54 S. Ct. 315, 78 L. Ed. 655 (1933) (sales of yellow pine products under
the name "California White Pine"); Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 4Vx, 42 S. Ct. i5o, 66 L. Ed. 307 (9z2) (a
plan under which special agents were employed to locate violators who sold
below the prices "suggested" and such violators placed on a list of those to
whom the company's goods were not to be sold, reinstatement being withheld
until assurance was given that the products would be sold at the right prices
in the future).
s Corwin, Anti-Trust Acts and the Constitution, 18 Va. L. Rev. 355
(1932).
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ens to impose a substantial burden upon interstate commerce,
there is said to be a direct effect upon that commerce and such
action is immediately condemned. But where the state acts pur-
suant to a reasonable exercise of its governmental functions of
raising necessary revenue or protecting the lives, health, and
general well being of its citizens, no objection is raised by the
Supreme Court, the effect upon interstate commerce, if any,
being referred to as indirect. The qualification that the exercise
of such powers must be reasonable presupposes that the effect
upon interstate commerce will not be too great. The cases in
this field demonstrate again that the question is primarily one
of degree.
A direct burden upon interstate commerce was found where
one state attempted to require a license of a corporation located
in another state before it could buy and ship grain from the first
state to the second 88 where practically all of the wheat har-
vested in one state was shipped to other states, and a law of the
state where the grain was produced provided for inspectors who
were required to fix the price of the wheat after it had been
stored in local elevators, which amounted to fixing the profit
which the buyers could make;8" and where the same state
attempted to regulate the marketing of wheat by establishing a
system of grading, weighing, and measuring." In all three of
these situations there was an attempt on the part of the state to
control the interstate shipment of grain by statutory regulations
which would necessarily have a material effect upon the inter-
state trade in grain.
'A New York act attempting to regulate the price paid by a
New York dealer for milk acquired in Vermont was enjoined
in its operation upon sales of such milk in the original pack-
"8 Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 St. Ct.
io6, 66 L. Ed. 239 (1921).
"
9 Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 42 S. Ct. 244, 66 L. Ed.458 (1922)-
980 Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 45 S. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed.
909 (1925).
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ages." "Nice distinctions," the court said, "have been -made
between direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant when
the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary
tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of compe-
tition between the states. Such an obstruction is direct by the
very terms of the hypothesis.""2
Such a regulation by the state of New York threatened to
materially interfere with the interstate movement of Vermont
milk into New York. The economic welfare of New York citi-
zens was not deemed sufficient reason for permitting such a
substantial restraint of interstate commerce.
An agency established within a state for the purpose of
soliciting passengers and selling tickets for an interstate carrier
by rail or steamship, is an important part of interstate or foreign
commerce, a necessary adjunct thereto, and a state statute
requiring a license fee from such an agency constitutes a direct
burden upon interstate commerce. 3 The power to tax such an
agency, it was said, involved the lessening of the commerce of
the road to an extent commensurate with the amount of business
done by the agent. 4
A state law providing for the inspection of animals whose
meats are used for human consumption, is not a rightful exertion
of the state's police power, but a burden upon interstate com-
merce, where the inspection is of such a character that it will
prevent the introduction into the state of sound meats, the
product of animals slaughtered in other states.9 An act forbid-
ding the agent of an express company not incorporated by the
laws of the state to carry on business without first obtaining a
91 Baldwit; v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032
(1935).
2 Id., at p. 5±2.
"'McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104, 10 S. Ct. 88i, 34 L. Ed. 391
(189o); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 47 S. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed.
524 (Iz7).
94 i36 U.S. at p. iII.
95 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, io S. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455
(i89o); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, II S. Ct. 213, 34 L. Ed. 862
(1891).
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license was held to be a regulation of interstate commerce and
invalid." An act forbidding the shipment of unshelled shrimps
outside of the state, but permitting their transportation as soon
as shelled, was held to directly burden and obstruct interstate
commerce." And in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia," a law of
a state wherein natural gas was produced and was the recog-
nized subject of interstate commerce, which required that con-
sumers in that state should be accorded a preferred right to
purchase the gas over consumers in other states, was held in-
valid, the court saying:
Its provisions and the conditions which must surround its operation
are such that it necessarily and directly will compel the diversion to local
consumers of a large and increasing part of the gas heretofore and now
going to consumers in the complainant states, and therefore will work a
serious interference with that commerce.99
Serious consequences to the continued freedom of interstate
commerce were apprehended in this last group of cases, as in
the others, if the state regulations were allowed to stand. Those
regulations threatened to impose a substantial burden upon
interstate commerce.
In contrast to the cases where the effect upon interstate com-
merce is substantial by reason of the extent or character of the
state's control, numerous charges and regulations imposed by
the states have been held entirely valid regardless of the fact
that they may have had some effect upon interstate commerce.'
" Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 1i S. Ct. 851, 35 L. Ed. 64.9
(1891).
97 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. i, 49 S. Ct. 1, 73
L. Ed. 147 (i9z8).
98 ±6z U.S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117 (923).
99 Id., at p. 597-
100 A state may prescribe reasonable charges for intrastate transportation,
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511 (1913);
it may impose a license on locomotive engineers running trains within the
state, even though they are bound for points outside, SmitA v. Alabama, 124.
U.S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888); a state may regulate the
manufacture and sale of liquor within its own borders, regardless of the fact
that it may be intended for export, Kidd v. Pearson, 1z8 U.S. I, 9 S. Ct. 6,
32 L. Ed. 346 (1888); but it cannot prohibit such sale where it is imported
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These are cases where the effect is slight and therefore not cal-
culated to cause any noticeable diminution of the trade among
the several states, or where the charge or regulation is a reason-
able exercise of local authority and is not likely to produce a
heavy or undue burden upon interstate commerce.
Any attempt on the part of a state to require a license fee
from agents or solicitors engaged in selling goods by sample for
concerns located in other states, is invalid, amounting to a
"direct" burden upon interstate commerce."' In Robbins v.
in the original packages from other states, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100,
io S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. Iz8 (189o); a state's wrongful death act is valid
as applied to a cause of action arising out of a river boat collision, Sherlock v.
Aling, 93 U.S. 99, 23 L. Ed. 819 (1876); a state may subject coal and coke
barges to inspection although traveling in interstate commerce, Pittsburgh &
Southern Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U.S. 590, 15 S. Ct. 459, 39 L. Ed. 544
(895); reasonable charges for the use of a facility in interstate commerce,
such as a state or municipally owned wharf, have been upheld even though
such charges might enhance the cost of doing the business, Transportation Co.
v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, z S. Ct. 732, 27 L. Ed. 584 (1882); Packet
Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.s. 423, 25 L. Ed. 688 (1879), Packet Co. v. Catletts-
burg, 105 U.S. 559, 26 L. Ed. 1169 (x88s), Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S.
543, 7 S. Ct. 313, 3o L. Ed. 487 (i886) (involving a reasonable charge
for the use of river improvements), Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S.
444, 7 8. Ct. 907, 3o L. Ed. 976 (1887); a city may make a reasonable
charge for the use of its streets, St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
148 U.S. 9z, 13 S. Ct. 485, 37 L. Ed. 380 (1893); a state may prohibit
the waste of petroleum and may issue proration orders applying to the produc-
tion of oil (not to sales or transportation), even though the product is intended
for and is in fact immediately shipped in interstate commerce, Champlin Rfg.
Co. v. Corp. Com. of Oklahoma, z86 U.S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed.
io6z (1932).
"I' Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 27 S. Ct. 159, 51 L. Ed. 295
(x9o6); Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 23 S. Ct. 229, 47 L. Ed.
336 (1903); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 14 S. Ct. 829, 38 L. Ed.
719 (1894); Asher v. Texas, i28 U.S. I29, 9 S. Ct. 1, 32 L. Ed. 368
(iS888); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 9 S. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed.
637 (1889); Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 45
S. Ct. 525, 69 L. Ed. 982 (1925).
That such license fees would subject interstate commerce to a substantial
burden was indicated in Wellton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 347
(1875), where the court said: "Imposts operating as an absolute exclusion
of the goods would be possible, and all the evils of discriminating state legisla-
tion, favorable to the interests of one state, and injurious to the interests of
other states and countries, which existed previous to the adoption of the Con-
sitution, might follow, and the experience of the last fifteen years shows would
follow, fronm the action of some states. lb., at p. 28i."
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Shelby. Taxing District,' the Supreme Court made the follow-
ing statement:
The Constitution of the United States having given to Congress the
power to regulate commerce, not only with foreign nations, but among
the several states, that power is necessarily exclusive whenever the sub-
jects of it are national in their character, or admit only of one uniform
system or plan of regulation."0 3
This suggests a broad, basic test for all cases involving things
which affect interstate commerce. The federal government may
control all activities which, by reason of their nature or extent
have such an effect upon interstate commerce that the national
interest in them must be said to be greater than their local
interest and their regulation by the national authority more
practical, if not absolutely necessary.0"'
A reasonable wharfage charge upon river boats engaged in
interstate transportation... is no less direct in its effect upon
interstate commerce than a license fee upon agents and solicitors.
In both cases, the charge is made directly upon an instrumen-
tality of interstate trade, but because of the difference in the
character of the instrumentalities, their relative ability to pay,
and other similar considerations, the effect to be apprehended
in the former case is not nearly so great as that to be expected
in the latter case.
The same trend may be detected in the Supreme Court's
decisions relative to the states' power of taxation. No state has
the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form,
102 lzO U.S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 59 z , 30 L. Ed. 694 (1887).
303 Id., at p. 492.
104 In the Robbins case, supra (note 98), the court said further: "If the
selling of goods by sample and the employment of drummers for that purpose,
injuriously affect local interests of the states, Congress, if applied to, will
undoubtedly make such reasonable regulations as the case may demand. And
Congress alone can do it, for it is obvious that such regulations should be based
on a uniform system applicable to the whole country, and not left to the varied,
discordant, or retaliatory enactments of forty different states. Op. cit., note
102, at p. 498. See, Jane Alvies, The Commerce Power-from Gibbons v.
Ogden to the Wagner Act Cases, 3 O.S.L.J. 307, 326 (1937).
105 See cases cited in note 1oo, supra.
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whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the sub-
jects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that
transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it
on.'" Nevertheless, reasonable sources of revenue must be left
to the states, and it is only when a state tax threatens to mate-
rially burden the interstate movement of commodities or to
become a regulation thereof, that it is declared invalid. The
power to tax is the power to destroy, and where the state
attempts to tax, in effect, the interstate business of a corpora-
tion,"' the traffic over an interstate bridge,"0 8 or the stream of
gas and oil flowing through the state,' very serious conse-
quences to the freedom of such movement between the states
may be expected and the court has held such attempts uncon-
stitutional. But where the tax is merely laid upon the local
property of a company, even though that company may be doing
interstate business, the likelihood of such consequences is much
less and what effect there may be is said to be indirect."'
t'0 Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. I61, 1o S. Ct. 725, 34 L. Ed. i5o
(,890).
1,7 Testern Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, zI6 U.S. I, 30 S. Ct. 190,
54 L. Ed. 355 (91o) (where a state attempted by statute to impose the
requirement that a company, as a condition to its right of engaging in local
business, first pay into the state school fund a given per cent of its authorized
capital, representing all of its business and property everywhere); Leloup v.
Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 8 S. Ct. 1380, 3 z L. Ed. 311 (1888) (a general
license tax upon a telegraph company, which was said to affect its entire busi-
ness, interstate and domestic). Compare, State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts,
8z U.S. 284, z L. Ed. 164 (187z), where the tax was said to be upon the
income of the carrier, i.e., the fruits of transportation, realized and reduced
to possession, so as to have become part of the general capital and property Pf
the taxpayer. Such a tax was held valid.
'10 Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 14 S. Ct. 1087,
38 L. Ed. 96z (894).
" Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. z65, 42 S. Ct. ioi, 66
L. Ed. 227 (19z'); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277, 4Z
S. Ct. io5, 66 L. Ed. z34 (19zi). The state of West Virginia sought to tax
a stream of oil and gas flowing constantly through the state, but the court held
that the mere power of those who directed the stream to divert it from inter-
state commerce, when as a course of business it was constantly interstate, with
only minor diversions to intrastate commerce, did not expose to the state's
tvxing power that part of the flow which crossed state lines.
"" Where a state taxed tolls which were received by a railroad from other
carriers for the privilege of using its tracks within the state, it was held that
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To again adopt the words of the Supreme Court, "The
states cannot under under any guise impose direct burdens upon
interstate commerce. For this is but to hold that the states are
not permitted directly to regulate or restrain that which from
the tax was laid upon the corporation on account of its property in a railroad
and that this requirement of the usual proportional contribution to public
maintenance had merely an incidental effect upon interstate commerce. New
York, Etc. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U.s. 431, 438, 15 S. Ct. 896, 39
L. Ed. 1043 (1895).
A state has the power to impose a tax on a general commission business
carried on within the state, where the concern is not acting for any particular
firm within or without the state, Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U.S. I, Iz
S. Ct. 81o, 36 L. Ed. 6oi (1892); the business of buying and selling cotton
locally produced, processed and warehoused, is local in character, and a local
occupation tax upon the buyer does not contravene the commerce clause, al-
though the course of busi-ness is such that all of the cotton so bought is ulti-
mately shipped by the buyer in interstate or foreign commerce, Chassaniol v.
Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584, 54 S. Ct. 541, 78 L. Ed. 1004 (934); the busi-
ness of storing and compressing cotton produced locally and shipped into local
warehouses is local, and a non-discriminatory state tax upon it is valid, Federal
Compress Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17, 54 S- Ct. 267, 78 L. Ed. 622(1934) ; although a state' tax on the gross earnings from interstate commerce
is a burden thereon and repugnant to the commerce clause, the net incomejustly attributable to all classes of business done within the state, whether
derived from subsequent interstate transportation or not, may be used as a
measure of a tax imposed to pay the state for the use therein of a domestic
corporation's franchise, Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of
California, 297 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 553, 8o L. Ed. 791 (936). See, also,
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237
(1922).
Neither is there any objection to a state tax upon goods coming to rest
within a state, although they have been transported there from outside and are
intended to later continue their journey in interstate or foreign commerce.
Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. Ed. 6i5 (913);Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L. Ed. 257 (I885).
In the latter case, the court felt that there was "only an exercise of local
administration under the general taxing power, which, though it may inci-
dentally affect the subjects of commerce, is entirely within the power of the
state until Congress shall see fit to interfere and make express regulations on
the subject." lb., at p. 632. These words indicate that many of the decisions
above may not preclude regulation of the same subjects by the federal govern-
ment if and when it sees fit to enter. The cases where the state's action affects
interstate commerce only incidentally are sometimes grouped within a class
wherein it is said that the states have concurrent jurisdiction. See Covington
Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra, note io8, at p. 2 11. According to the Supreme
Court in this case, the jurisdiction of Congress is exclusive in matters national
in character. Op. cit., note io8, at p. 212.
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its nature should be under the control of one authority and be
free from restriction save as it is governed in the manner that
the national legislature constitutionally ordains.""'. But where
the subject is peculiarly one of local concern, and from its nature
belongs to the class of things with which the state appropriately
deals in providing for local needs, the burden upon interstate
commerce is said to be indirect and the state tax or other regula-
tion is valid. It has become increasingly apparent that the
degree of the burden upon interstate commerce is the "tip-off"
when it becomes necessary to decide whether a particular activ-
ity is national in its character and admits only of one uniform
system or plan of regulation or is a local matter which must
be controlled by the states.
The purpose of this discussion has been to reveal the true
nature of the shibboleth which has served the Supreme Court
of the United States so faithfully and for so many years. It is
submitted that the formula which conditions the exercise of the
federal commerce power upon a determination that the subject
of regulation affects interstate commerce directly rather than
indirectly, is little more than a convenient label which in reality
merely serves to describe the result of the court's deliberations.
The thought is not entirely novel, nor yet without precedent.
It has found expression in the words of at least two of the
Justices seated on the Supreme Bench.
Justice Stone, in his dissenting opinion in Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania,"'a is responsible for the following statement, which is
one of the most searching and thoughtful explanations of the
real problem involved to be found anywhere:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquir-
ing whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems
to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote
from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions,
"direct" and "indirect interference" with commerce, we are doing little
more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached.
... Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, note ioo, at p. 400.
112 Note 93, supra.
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But it seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are
to be sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect,
but because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the
nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the business in-
volved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the con-
clusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does
not infringe the national interest in maintaining the freedom of com-
merce across state lines."1 '
The principle applies as well to cases involving the federal
government's power to regulate by virtue of the authority con-
ferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution, bringing
within that power those activities which are peculiarly national
in character and which affect interstate commerce to the extent
of imposing a substantial burden thereon.
Justice Cardozo, in his dissenting opinion in the Carter case,
pointed out that many of the effects upon interstate commerce,
agreed by everyone to be direct, are in fact indirect in the true
sense of the word. "A survey of the cases," he concluded,
"shows that the words have been interpreted with suppleness
of adaptation and flexibility of meaning. The power is as broad
as the need that evokes it."""
The decisions of the Supreme Court cited in this article
reveal that almost invariably the court is chiefly concerned with
the degree of the effect upon interstate commerce. If sufficient
danger to interstate commerce appears, no matter how remote
the source, Congress will be conceded the power to act. Recog-
nition of this fact, officially, has been somewhat belated, but it
has finally appeared in the opinion of the majority in the Jones
& Laughlin case.
If a precise formula is needed, the following deductions
may be suggested:
(i) The federal government has the power to control those
things which affect interstate commerce when all the factors and
circumstances involved give the things concerned a national
113 Op. cit., note 93, at p. 44.
114 Op. cit., note 14, at p. 328.
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character and significance which outweighs their inherently local
characteristics.
(2) So long as the local interest remains predominant and
the things concerned are best controlled by local regulation, any
effect upon interstate commerce which may be found will not be
sufficient to invoke the federal power.
(3) One of the most important factors in determining the
character of the things concerned is the degree of the effect upon
interstate commerce.
(4) The consideration of the degree of the effect, however,
may be offset to some extent where the things concerned are of
such a nature that they cannot be readily distinguished from a
large number of other things which are intrinsically local and
cannot be brought within the power of the federal government
without obliterating the federal system.
In any event, it must be recognized that the direct and indi-
rect test is not a trustworthy formula. The primary question,
from a practical standpoint, is one of degree.
